Overview

The Study on States of Emergency and National Security (2012) is a comprehensive analytical report commissioned by the Council of Europe to evaluate how member states declare, implement, and terminate emergency measures while complying with democratic standards and human rights obligations. The study was produced in response to a rising trend of prolonged emergency declarations across Europe following the global financial crisis, counter-terrorism operations, and large-scale public health and migration challenges.[1]

Authored by a consortium of legal scholars, constitutional experts, and human rights practitioners, the report examines the tension between state sovereignty during crises and the rule of law, emphasizing that emergency powers must remain exceptional, temporary, proportional, and subject to judicial oversight.[2]

Methodology & Scope

The research team conducted a multi-country comparative analysis, reviewing constitutional provisions, emergency legislation, judicial rulings, and governmental practices across 28 Council of Europe member states. Data collection included statutory analysis, expert interviews, case law review (2005–2011), and field assessments in jurisdictions with active emergency regimes.[4]

The methodology prioritized transparency, cross-jurisdictional consistency, and adherence to the Venice Commission's standards on constitutional review. Special attention was given to the distinction between de jure emergency declarations and de facto security measures that circumvent formal derogation procedures.

Key Findings

The study identified several systemic vulnerabilities in how European states manage emergency powers:

  1. Normalization of Exception: Multiple states utilized rolling emergency declarations to maintain expanded executive powers beyond the original crisis period, effectively normalizing exceptional measures.
  2. Insufficient Parliamentary Scrutiny: In 60% of reviewed jurisdictions, emergency decrees bypassed full legislative debate, relying on simplified ratification procedures that weakened democratic oversight.
  3. Judicial Hesitancy: Constitutional courts frequently deferred to executive security assessments, citing the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, which diluted proportionality reviews.
  4. Data & Transparency Gaps: Limited public access to emergency response data hindered academic research and civil society monitoring.

The report concluded that while emergency powers are legally permissible under international frameworks, their prolonged application without robust checks poses structural risks to constitutional democracy.[5]

Recommendations

The study proposed a set of binding guidelines for Council of Europe member states:

  • Establish clear statutory time limits for emergency declarations, with mandatory parliamentary renewal votes.
  • Create independent oversight commissions to audit emergency expenditures and human rights compliance.
  • Require real-time public reporting of measures taken under Article 15 derogations.
  • Strengthen judicial review mechanisms to ensure proportionality assessments are substantive rather than procedural.
  • Develop cross-border emergency governance protocols aligned with EU and CoE standards.

Impact & Legacy

Published in early 2012, the study significantly influenced subsequent CoE policy frameworks, including the 2014 Venice Commission guidelines on constitutional review in times of crisis and the 2018 Committee of Ministers' resolution on emergency governance. Its analytical framework was adapted during the European response to the 2020–2022 public health emergency, where the report's proportionality and sunset-clause recommendations were widely referenced by constitutional courts and parliamentary committees.[6]

The study remains archived in the Aevum Encyclopedia's European Legal History and Comparative Governance collections, with periodic scholarly annotations and jurisdictional updates.

References

  1. Council of Europe. (2012). Study on States of Emergency and National Security: Comparative Analysis & Legal Standards. Strasbourg: Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law.
  2. von Bogdandy, A., & Schaad, N. (2012). "The ECHR in Times of Crisis: Derogation, Margin of Appreciation, and Democratic Resilience." European Constitutional Law Review, 8(2), 215–248.
  3. European Court of Human Rights. (2011). A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Application no. 3455/05.
  4. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). (2012). Study on Constitutional Review in Times of Emergency, CDL-AD(2012)029.
  5. García de Enterría, E. (2013). "Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law in Europe: A Post-2012 Assessment." International Journal of Constitutional Law, 11(3), 589–612.
  6. Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe. (2018). Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)5 on Governance in Times of Crisis.